Coarse correlation models strategic interactions of rational agents complemented by a correlation device, that is a mediator that can recommend behavior but not enforce it. Despite being a classical concept in the theory of normal-form games for more than forty years, not much is known about the merits of coarse correlation in extensive-form settings. In this paper, we consider two instantiations of the idea of coarse correlation in extensiveform games: normal-form coarse-correlated equilibrium (NFCCE), already defined in the literature, and extensive-form coarse-correlated equilibrium (EFCCE), which we introduce for the first time. We show that EFCCE is a subset of NFCCE and a superset of the related extensiveform correlated equilibrium. We also show that, in two-player extensive-form games, social-welfaremaximizing EFCCEs and NFCEEs are bilinear saddle points, and give new efficient algorithms for the special case of games with no chance moves. In our experiments, our proposed algorithm for NFCCE is two to four orders of magnitude faster than the prior state of the art.
Introduction
As a generic term, correlated equilibrium denotes a family of solution concepts whereby a mediator that can recomAuthor emails: G. Farina <gfarina@cs.cmu.edu>; T. Bianchi <tommaso4.bianchi@mail.polimi.it>; T. Sandholm <sandholm@cs.cmu.edu>. This work was done while T. Bianchi was visiting Carnegie Mellon University. mend behavior but not enforce it complements the interaction of fully rational agents. Before the game starts, a mediator-also called a correlation device-samples a tuple of normal-form plans (one for each player) from a publicly known correlated distribution. He or she then proceeds to privately ask to each player whether they would like to commit to playing according to the plan that was sampled for them. Being an equilibrium, the correlated distribution must be such that no player has benefit in not following the recommendations, assuming all other players follow. As argued by Ashlagi et al. (2008) , correlated equilibrium is a good candidate to model strategic interactions in which intermediate forms of centralized control can be achieved.
In the context of extensive-form (that is, sequential) games, two different instantiations of the idea of correlated equilibrium are well-known in the literature: normal-form correlated equilibrium (NFCE) (Aumann, 1974; Gilboa & Zemel, 1989) and extensive-form correlated equilibrium (EFCE) (von Stengel & Forges, 2008) . The two solution concepts differ in what the mediator reveals to the players. In an NFCE, the mediator privately reveals to each player, just before the game starts, the (whole) normal-form plan that was sampled for them. Players are then free to either play according to the plan, or play any other strategy that they desire. In an EFCE the mediator does not reveal the whole plan to the players before the game starts. Instead, he or she incrementally reveals the plan by recommending individual moves. Each recommended move is only revealed when the player reaches the decision point for which the recommendation is relevant. Each player is free to play a move different than the recommended one, but doing so comes at the cost of future recommendations, as the mediator will immediately stop issuing recommendations to players that defect. Be-
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ARXIV PREPRINT -AUGUST 28, 2019 cause of this deterrent, and because players have to decide whether to follow recommendations knowing less about the sampled normal-form plan than in NFCE, a social-welfaremaximizing EFCE always achieves social welfare equal or higher than any NFCE.
Coarse correlated equilibrium differs from correlated equilibrium in that players must decide whether or not to commit to playing according to the recommendations of the mediator before observing such recommendations. Normal-form coarse-correlated equilibrium (NFCCE) (Moulin & Vial, 1978) is the coarse equivalent of NFCE. Before the game starts, players decide whether to commit to playing according to the normal-form plan that was sampled by the mediator (from some correlated distribution known to players), without observing such a plan first. Players who decide to commit will privately receive the plan that was sampled for them; players that decide to not commit will not receive any recommended plan, and are free to play according to any strategy they desire. Since players know less at the time of commitment than either NFCE or EFCE, a social-welfaremaximizing NFCCE is always guaranteed to achieve equal or higher social welfare than any NFCE or EFCE. No coarse equivalent of EFCE is currently known in the literature.
In this paper, we introduce the coarse equivalent of EFCE, which we coin extensive-form coarse-correlated equilibrium (EFCCE). It is an intermediate solution concept between EFCE and NFCCE. Specifically, EFCCE is akin to EFCE in that each recommended move is only revealed when the players reach the decision point for which the recommendation is relevant. However, unlike EFCE, the acting player must choose whether or not to commit to the recommended move before such a move is revealed to them, instead of after. Figure 1 shows how EFCCE fits inside of the family of correlated and coarse-correlated solution concepts.
We prove that EFCCE is always a subset of NFCCE and a superset of EFCE, and give an example of a game in which the three solution concepts lead to distinct solution sets. We also show that the problem of computing a socialwelfare-maximizing EFCCE can be represented as a bilinear saddle-point, which can be solved in polynomial time in two-player extensive-form games with no chance moves but not in games with more than two players or two-player games with chance moves. Finally, we note that in twoplayer games with no chance moves, EFCCE leads to a linear program whose size is smaller than EFCE; because of this, EFCCE can also be used as a computationally lighter relaxation of EFCE-for example, as a routine in the algorithm byČermák et al. (2016); Bošanskỳ et al. (2017) for computing strong Stackelberg equilibrium.
We also show that the problem of computing a social-welfaremaximizing NFCCE can be expressed as a bilinear saddlepoint problem, which can be solved in polynomial time in two-player extensive-form games with no chance moves (the problem is known to be NP-hard in games with more than two players and/or chance moves). This formulation is significant, as it enables several new classes of algorithms to be employed to compute social-welfare-maximizing NFCCE. In particular, we show that it enables a linear programming formulation that in our experiments is two to four orders of magnitude faster than the prior state of the art.
What is revealed
When the decision is made Before seeing the recomm.
After seeing the recomm.
Single move incrementally
Whole strategy upfront
NFCCE [Moulin & Vial (1978)] NFCE [Aumann (1974) ] Figure 1 . Taxonomy of correlated and coarse-correlated equilibria.
Preliminaries

Extensive-Form Games
Extensive-form games are played on a game tree, and can capture both sequential and simultaneous moves, as well as private information. Each node v in the game tree belongs to exactly one player i ∈ {1, . . . , n} ∪ {c}. Player c is a special player called the chance player; it is used to denote random events that happen in the game, such as drawing a card from a deck or tossing a coin. The edges leaving v represent actions that the player can take at that node; we denote the set of actions available at v as A v . In order to capture private information, the set of nodes that belong to each player i ∈ {1, . . . , n} are partitioned into a collection I i of nonempty sets. Each I ∈ I i is called an information set of Player i, and is a set of nodes that Player i cannot distinguish between, given what the player has observed so far. In this paper, we only consider games with perfect recall, that is games where no player forgets what he or she knew earlier. Necessarily, for any I ∈ I i and u, v ∈ I, it must be A u = A v , or otherwise Player i would be able to distinguish between u and v. For this reason, we will often write A I to mean the set of available actions at any node in I, defined as A I := A u for any u ∈ I. Finally, two information sets I i , I j for Player i and j, respectively, are said to be connected, denoted I i I j if there exist u ∈ I i , v ∈ I j such that the path from the root to u passes through v or vice versa.
Nodes v for which A v is empty are called leaves, and denote an end state of the game. We denote the set of leaves of the game with the symbol Z. Each z ∈ Z is associated with a tuple of n payoffs (one for each non-chance player); we denote u i (z) the payoff for Player i ∈ {1, . . . , n} at z.
Sequences (Σ)
The set of sequences of Player i, denoted Σ i , is defined as the set Σ i := {(I, a) : I ∈ I i , a ∈ A I } ∪ {∅ i }, where the special sequence ∅ i is called empty sequence. Given a node v the belongs to Player 1, the parent sequence of v, denoted σ i (v), is defined as the last sequence (I, a) ∈ Σ i encountered on the path from the root to v; if no such sequence exists (i.e., Player i never acts before v), we let σ i (v) = ∅ i . The parent sequence σ(I) of an information set I ∈ I i is defined as σ(I) := σ(v) where v is any node in I (all choices produce the same parent sequence, since the game is assumed to have perfect recall). Finally, we introduce the concept of relevant pairs of sequences. Given two sequences σ i and σ j for two distinct Player i and j, respectively, we say that the pair (σ i , σ j ) is relevant if either one sequence is the empty sequence, or if σ i = (I i , a i ), σ j = (I j , a j ) and I i I j .
Reduced-Normal-Form Plans (Π)
A normal-form plan for Player i defines a choice of action a I ∈ A I for every information set I ∈ I i of the player. However, this representation contains irrelevant information, as some information sets of Player i may become unreachable after the player makes certain decisions higher up the tree. A reduced-normal-form plan π is a normalform plans where this irrelevant information is removed: it defines a choice of action π(I) = a I ∈ A I for every information set I ∈ I i that is still reachable as a result of the other choices in π itself. We denote the set of reducednormal-form plans of Player i as Π i . Given a sequence σ = (I, a) ∈ Σ i , we denote with Π i (σ) the (sub)set of reduced-normal-form plans π that prescribe that Player i play all actions on the path from the root to any node v ∈ I, including playing action a at v. More formally, we let Π i (∅ i ) := Π i and recursively for any σ = (I, a) ∈ Σ i we let
We will also make frequent use of the shorthand
to denote the set of reduced-normal-form plans that allow Player i to reach leaf z ∈ Z, and Π i (I) := Π i (σ i (I)) to denote the set of reduced-normal-form plans that allow Player i to reach information set I ∈ I i . Finally, a reduced-normalform strategy for Player i is a probability distribution over Π i .
Polytope of Sequence-Form Strategies (Q)
The sequence-form representation (Romanovskii, 1962; Koller et al., 1996; von Stengel, 1996) is a more compact way of representing normal-form strategies of a player in a perfect-recall extensive-form game. Formally, fix a player i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and let µ be a reduced-normal-form strategy for Player i, that is some probability distribution over Π i . The sequence-form strategy induced by µ is the nonnegative real vector y, indexed over σ ∈ Σ i , defined as
The set of sequence-form strategies that can be induced as µ varies over the set of all possible probability distributions over Π i is denoted Q i . In particular, Koller et al. (1996) prove that it is a convex polytope (called the sequence-form polytope) in R |Σi| + , described by the affine constraint
where F i is a sparse |I i | × |Σ i | matrix with entries in {0, 1, −1}, and f i is a vector with entries in {0, 1}.
Polytope of Extensive-Form Correlation Plans (Ξ)
Given any probability distribution µ over × n i=1
Π i in an extensive-form game, the correlation plan ξ induced by µ is defined as the real vector, indexed over tuples
Σ i of pairwise-relevant sequences, where each entry is
The set of correlation plans ξ that can be induced as µ varies over the set of all possible probability distributions is denoted as Ξ and called the polytope of extensive-form correlation plans. It is always a polytope in a space of dimension polynomial in the input game description. Furthermore, in two-player games without chance moves, Ξ can be described as the intersection of a polynomial number (in the game tree) linear constraints, as shown by von Stengel & Forges (2008) . The same authors also prove that this property does not always hold in games with more than two players and/or chance moves.
Finally, for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, σ ∈ Σ i , and z ∈ Z, we introduce the following notation that we will use often in the remainder of this paper:
Saddle-Point Formulation of NFCCE
In this section, we show that the problem of computing an NFCCE that achieves social welfare at least τ (for some given τ ∈ R) in an n-player extensive-form game with perfect recall can be expressed as a bilinear saddle-point problem, that is as an optimization problem of the form
where X and Y are convex and compact sets. In our specific case, X and Y will be convex polytopes in low-dimensional spaces (in particular,
). As we will show later, this formulation immediately implies that in two-player games with no chance moves, a social-welfare-maximizing NFCCE can be computed in polynomial time as the solution of a linear program.
We now go through the steps that enable us to formulate the problem of computing an NFCCE as a bilinear saddle-point problem. The general structure of the argument is similar to that of Farina et al. (2019) in the context of EFCE, and we will use it again later when dealing with EFCCE.
Π i is an NFCCE if no player has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from the recommended plan assuming that nobody else does. More formally, let i be any player, and letμ i be any probability distribution over Π i , independent of µ. Playing according toμ must give Player i an expected utilityû i at most equal to the expected utility u i of committing to the mediator's recommendation. In order to expressû i and u i as a function of µ andμ, it is necessary to quantify the probability of the game ending in any leaf z ∈ Z. When the Player deviates and plays according toμ i , the probability that the game ends in z is equal to the probability that the mediator samples a plan π j ∈ Π j (z) for any Player j other than i, and that Player i samples a plan π i ∈ Π i (z). Correspondingly, using the independence of µ andμ i , we can writê
On the other hand, the probability that leaf z is reached when all players commit to the mediator's recommendation is equal to the probability that the mediator samples from µ plans π j ∈ Π j (z) for all players j ∈ {1, . . . , n}:
Using the definition of extensive-form correlation plan (2) and sequence-form strategy (1) we can convert the requirement thatû i ≤ u i for all choices of i andμ i into the following equivalent condition: Proposition 1. An extensive-form correlation plan ξ ∈ Ξ is an NFCCE if and only if the following inequality holds for any player i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and sequence-form strategy
Inequality (4) is of the form ξ A i y i − b i ξ ≤ 0, where A i and b i are suitable sparse matrices/vectors that only depend on i. With this new notation, we can rewrite the condition in Proposition 1 as follows: ξ ∈ Ξ is an NFCCE if and only if
where in the last transformation we operated a change of variableỹ i := λ i y i ; it is a simple exercise to prove that this change of variable is legitimate and that the domain of the maximization is a convex polytope. Since an NFCCE always exists, in particular any ξ such that
is guaranteed to be an NFCCE. Since the domains of the minimization and maximization problems are both convex polytopes, and since the objective function is bilinear, the optimization problem in (6) is a bilinear saddle-point problem.
Enforcing a Lower Bound on Social Welfare
Given an NFCCE µ, social welfare is defined as SW := n i=1 u i , where u i is as in Equation (3). Hence, it is a linear function of the correlation plan ξ, which can be expressed as SW : Ξ ξ → c ξ where c := n i=1 b i . Consequently, an NFCCE that guarantees a given lower bound τ on the social welfare can be expressed as in (6) where the domain of the minimization is changed from ξ ∈ Ξ to ξ ∈ Ξ ∩ {ξ : c ξ ≥ τ }. Note that this preserves the polyhedral nature of the optimization domain.
Finally, the same construction can be used verbatim if social welfare is replaced with any linear function of ξ.
Connection to Linear Programming
The saddle-point formulation in (6) can be mechanically translated into a linear program by taking the dual of the internal maximization problem, that is of 5. Specifically, the dual problem is the linear program (7) :
(See the Preliminaries section for the meaning of F i and f i ). Problem (7) has a polynomial number of variables and constraints.
By strong duality, the value of (7) is the same as the value of the primal problem, that is the maximum 'deviation benefit' u i − u i across all players i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and probability distributionsμ i over Π i . Hence, we can find an NFCCE ξ that maximizes any given objective c ξ by adding the constraint u ≤ 0 and solving the modified linear program (8) :
The linear program above always has a polynomial number of variables, but potentially an exponential number of constraints because of the condition ξ ∈ Ξ. However, in two-player extensive-form games with no chance moves, (8) is guaranteed to have a polynomial number of constraints as Ξ can be described compactly (von Stengel & Forges, 2008) . Hence, in those games a social-welfare-maximizing NFCCE can be computed in polynomial time after setting c :=
EFCCE: An Intermediate Solution Concept
In this section, we introduce a new solution concept which we coin extensive-form coarse-correlated equilibrium (EFCCE). It combines the idea of coarse correlation-that is, players must decide whether they want to commit to following the recommendations issued by the correlation device, before observing such recommendations-with the idea of extensive-form correlation-that is, recommendations are revealed incrementally as the players progress on the game tree. Specifically, EFCCE is akin to EFCE in that each recommended move is only revealed when the players reach the decision point for which the recommendation is relevant. However, unlike EFCE, the acting player must choose whether or not to commit to the recommended move before such a move is revealed to them, instead of after. Each choice is binding only with respect to the decision point for which the choice is made, and players can make different choices at different decision points. Just like EFCE, defections (that is, deciding to not commit to following the correlation device's recommended move) come at the cost of future recommendations, as the correlation device will stop issuing recommendations to the defecting player.
As with all correlated equilibria, the correlated distribution from which the recommendations are sampled must be such no player has incentives to unilaterally deviate when no other player does.
Saddle-Point Formulation
In this section, we show that an EFCCE can also be expressed as the solution to a bilinear saddle-point problem.
To do so, we use the idea of trigger agents (Gordon et al., 2008; Dudik & Gordon, 2009 ):
Definition 1. Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n} be a player, letÎ ∈ I i be an information set for Player i, and letμ be a probability distribution over Π i (Î). An (Î,μ)-trigger agent for Player i is a player that commits to and follows all recommendations issued by the mediator until they reach a node v ∈Î (if any). When any node v ∈Î is reached, the player 'gets triggered', stops committing the recommendations and instead plays according to a reduced-normal-form plan sampled fromμ until the game ends.
Π i is an EFCCE when, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the value u i that Player i obtains by following the recommendations is at least as large as the expected utilityûÎ attained by any (Î,μ)-trigger agent for that player (assuming nobody else deviates). The expected utility for Player i when everybody commits to following the mediator's recommendations is as in Equation (3). In order to express the expected utility of the (Î,μ)-trigger agent, we start by computing the probability of the game ending in each possible leaf z ∈ Z. Let (π 1 , . . . , π n ) be the tuple of reduced-normal-form plans that was sampled by the mediator. Two cases must be distinguished:
• The path from the root to z passes through a node v ∈Î. We denote the set of such leaves as ZÎ . In this case, the trigger agent commits to following all recommendations until just beforeÎ, and then plays according to a reduced-normal-form planπ ∈ Π i (Î) sampled from the distributionμ fromÎ onwards. Hence, the following conditions are necessary and sufficient for the game to terminate at z:
Correspondingly, the probability that the game ends at z ∈ ZÎ is
(9)
• Otherwise, the trigger agent never gets triggered, and instead commits to following all recommended moves until the end of the game. The probability that the game ends at z ∈ Z \ ZÎ is therefore
With this information, the expected utility of the (Î,μ)-trigger agent is computed aŝ
Using to the definition of extensive-form correlation plan (2) and sequence-form strategy (1), we can rewrite the condition u i ≥ûÎ (which must hold for all choices of i,Î ∈ I i and probability distributionμ over Π i (Î)) compactly as in the following proposition. Proposition 2. An extensive-form correlation plan ξ ∈ Ξ is an EFCCE if and only if the following inequality holds for any player i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, information setÎ ∈ I i , and sequence-form strategy y i,Î ∈ Q i such that y i,Î (σ(Î)) = 1:
Inequality (11) From here, one can follow the same steps that we already took in the case of NFCCE and obtain a bilinear saddlepoint formulation and a linear program for EFCCE. For space reasons, we only state the linear program, which we also implemented and tested (see Experimental Evaluation section).
(12) :
The linear program (12) has a polynomial number of variables, and in two-player game with no chance it has also a polynomial number of constraints because of the polynomial description of Ξ (von Stengel & Forges, 2008) . In particular, in two-player games with no chance moves, a social-welfaremaximizing EFCCE can be computed in polynomial time by setting the objective function c ξ to be the social welfare
Finally, we remark that the EFCCE linear program (12) has more constraints and variables than NFCCE (see (8) 
Complexity Results
In this section, we discuss complexity results relating to the problem of computing a social-welfare maximizing EFCCE.
As we have already pointed out, in the case of two-player games without chance, the linear program in (12) has a polynomial number of constraints and variables, and can therefore be solved in polynomial time using standard LP technology. We now point out that, as in NFCCE and EFCE, the same does not hold in general for games with more than two players and/or chance moves. In particular, the following results can be easily obtained by using the same reduction employed by von Stengel & Forges (2008):
Definition 2 (SW EFCCE (κ)). Given an extensive-form game Γ and a real number κ, SW EFCCE (κ) denotes the problem of deciding whether or not Γ admits an EFCCE with social welfare at least κ. 
Relationships Between Equilibria
In this section, we analyze some relationships between EFCE, EFCCE and NFCCE. We start with the following inclusion lemma, which shows that the solution concept that we just introduced, EFCCE, is a superset of EFCE and a subset of NFCCE (a proof of all propositions is available in the Supplemental Material):
Proposition 5. Let Γ be a perfect-recall extensive-form game. Then we have the following inclusion of equilibria EFCE ⊆ EFCCE ⊆ NFCCE.
Proposition 5 applies to games with more than two players and/or chance moves as well. Let U EFCE , U EFCCE , U NFCCE denote the set of expected payoff vectors that can be induced by EFCE, EFCCE and NFCCE, respectively. Then, Proposition 5 is an important ingredient for our next proposition:
Proposition 6. The sets U EFCE , U EFCCE , U NFCCE are convex polytopes. Furthermore, U EFCE ⊆ U EFCCE ⊆ U NFCCE .
Proposition 5 also implies the following relationship between the maximum social welfare that can be obtained by EFCE, EFCCE and NFCCE: Figure 2 shows the set of payoff vectors that can be induced by EFCE, EFCCE and NFCCE in an instance of the Sheriff game (Farina et al., 2019) (left) and an instance of a 3-card Goofspiel game (Ross, 1971 ) (right). In the Sheriff game instance, we have that both inclusions in Proposition 6 are strict, while in the Goofspiel game only the inclusion U EFCE U EFCCE is strict, while U EFCCE = U NFCCE . The appendix contains an instance of a Battleship game (Farina et al., 2019) in which only the inclusion U EFCCE U NFCCE is strict, while U EFCE = U EFCCE .
In the game of 2 (left) the inequalities between the values of the maximum social welfare (Corollary 1) are both strict, whereas in 2 (right) both inequalities are equalities.
Experimental Evaluation
We experimentally compare NFCCE, EFCCE and EFCE both in terms of maximum social welfare and run time.
In our experiments, we use instances from three different two-player games with no chance moves: Sheriff (Farina et al., 2019) , Battleship (Farina et al., 2019) and Goofspiel (Ross, 1971) , whose full descriptions are available in the Supplemental Material. Sheriff is a bargaining game, in which two players-respectively, the Smuggler and the Sheriff-must settle on an appropriate bribe so as to avoid
The polytopes of reachable payoffs were computed with the help of Polymake, a tool for computational polyhedral geometry (Gawrilow & Joswig, 2000; Assarf et al., 2017) . the Sheriff inspecting the Smuggler's cargo, which might or might not contain illegal items. Battleship is a parametric version of the classic board game, where two competing fleets take turns at shooting at each other. Finally, Goofspiel is a card game in which two players repeatedly bid to win a common public card, which will be discarded in case of bidding ties. The three games were chosen as to illustrate three different applications in which an intermediate form of centralized control (the correlation device) is beneficial: bargaining in Sheriff, conflict resolution in Battleship, and bidding in Goofspiel.
We used Gurobi 8.1.1 (Gurobi Optimization, 2019) to solve the linear programs (8) for NFCCE, (12) for EFCCE, and (16) for EFCE (the latter is given in the Supplemental Material). We use the barrier algorithm without crossover, and we let Gurobi automatically the recommended number of threads for execution. All experiments were run on a 64-core machine with 512 GB of RAM.
Our experimental results are available in Table 1 for Battleship, Table 2 for Sheriff and Table 3 in the Supplemental Material for Goofspiel. Each table is split into three parts. Part (a) contains information about the parameters that were used to generate the game instances (refer to the Supplemental Material for a detailed description of their effects). It also shows the size of the instances in terms of number of sequences pairs, defined as the product |Σ 1 | × |Σ 2 | of the number of sequences of the players, and number of relevant pairs of sequences (see Preliminaries section). Part (b) compares the run times of our algorithm (column 'LP'). In the case of NFCCE, we also compare against the only known polynomial-time algorithms to compute social-welfare-maximizing NFCCE in extensive-form games, which are both based on the column generation tech- nique, and have been introduced by Celli et al. (2019) . In particular, we implemented both the algorithm based on a linear programming oracle, denoted 'CG-LP' in the tables, and the 'more practical' algorithm 'CG-MILP' based on a mixed integer linear programming oracle that is proposed by Celli et al. (2019) as a practically faster approach for most applications. CG-LP is guaranteed to compute a social-welfare-maximizing NFCCE in polynomial time, whereas CG-MILP requires exponential time in the worst case. Finally, Part (c) reports the value of the maximum social welfare that can be attained by NFCCE, EFCCE and EFCE.
Comparison of Run Time
As expected, increasing the coarseness of the equilibriumfrom EFCE to EFCCE to NFCCE-reduces the linear program size which results in a smaller run time. Empirically, the NFCCE linear program is up to four times faster than the EFCCE linear program, and the EFCCE linear program is in turn between two to four times faster than the EFCE linear program. Furthermore, our results indicate that the NFCCE linear program that we develop in (8) is two to four orders of magnitude faster than CG-LP and CG-MILP, and it is able to scale to game instances even up to five orders of magnitude larger than CG-LP and CG-MILP can in 24 hours. We believe that this difference in performance is partly due to the fact that the algorithms by Celli et al. (2019) have a number of variables that scales with the total number |Σ 1 | × |Σ 2 | of sequence pairs in the game, whereas our linear programming formulation has a number of columns that grows with the number of relevant sequence pairs, which is only a tiny fraction of the total number of sequence pairs in practice.
Comparison of Maximum Social Welfare
Our results experimentally confirm Corollary 1: as the coarseness of the equilibrium increases from EFCE to EFCCE to NFCCE, so does the value of the maximum social welfare that the mediator can induce. The maximum social welfare attained by NFCCE is strictly larger than EFCCE and EFCE in Battleship (Table 1) and Sheriff (Table 2) , while it is the same in Goofspiel (3 in the Supplemental Material).
Experimentally, the maximum social welfare that can be obtained through EFCCE is often equal to the maximum social welfare that can be obtained through EFCE. While this does not imply that the set of reachable payoffs is the same (see Figure 2) , it is an indication of the fact that EFCCE is a tight relaxation of EFCE which can be solved up to four times faster than EFCE in practice.
Conclusions
In this paper we studied two instantiations of the idea of coarse correlation in extensive-form games: normal-form coarse-correlated equilibrium and extensive-form coarsecorrelated equilibrium. For both solution concepts, we gave saddle-point problem formulations and linear programs.
We proved that EFCCE, which we introduced for the first time, is an intermediate solution concept between NFCCE and the extensive-form correlated equilibrium introduced by von Stengel & Forges (2008) . In particular, the set of payoffs that can be reached by EFCCE is always a superset of those that can be reached by EFCE, and a subset of those that can be reached by NFCCE. Empirically, EFCCE is a tight relaxation of EFCE, and a social-welfare-maximizing EFCCE can be computed up to four times faster than EFCE. This suggests that EFCCE could be a suitable and faster alternative in algorithms that rely on EFCE, such as the algorithm byČernỳ et al. (2018) in the context of Stackelberg games.
Finally, we compared the run time of our algorithm for computing social-welfare-maximizing NFCCEs, and showed that it is two to four orders of magnitude faster than the only previously known algorithms by Celli et al. (2019) . Our algorithm can also scale to game instances up to five orders of magnitude larger than the prior state of the art, thus enabling the computation of coarse-correlated solution concepts in medium-sized extensive-form games for the first time.
Supplemental Material
A. Formulation of EFCE
In this section, we show that an EFCE can also be expressed as the solution to a bilinear saddle-point problem. To do so, we resort again to the idea of trigger agents (Gordon et al., 2008; Dudik & Gordon, 2009) , slightly modifying the definition of trigger agent that we have given in the section about EFCCE to allow for deviations to happen after the recommendations have been received: Definition 3. Let i ∈ {1, . . . , n} be a player, letσ = (Î,â) ∈ Σ i be a sequence for Player i, and letμ be a probability distribution over Π i (Î). An (σ,μ)-trigger agent for Player i is a player that follows all recommendations issued by the mediator unless they get recommended to plaŷ a at information setÎ; if this happens, the player 'gets triggered', stops following the recommendations and instead plays according to a reduced-normal-form plan sampled fromμ until the game ends.
Π i is an EFCE when, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the value u i that Player i obtains by following the recommendations is at least as large as the expected utilityûσ attained by any (σ,μ)-trigger agent for that player (assuming nobody else deviates). The expected utility for Player i when everybody follows the mediator's recommendations is as in Equation (3). On the other hand, the expected utility for the (σ,μ)-trigger agent can be computed similarly to the one for the (Î,μ)-trigger agent that we have computed in the section of EFCCE. We thus compute the probability of the game ending in any terminal node z ∈ Z, this time distinguishing three cases:
• The path from the root to z includes playing action a at information setÎ. We denote the set of such leaves as Zσ. In this case, the trigger agent follows all recommendations untilâ get recommended, and then plays according to a reduced-normal-form plan π ∈ Π i (Î) sampled from the distributionμ fromÎ onwards. To reach leaf z, however, we need to have that the reduced-normal-form planπ includes playinĝ a atÎ. Hence, the following conditions are necessary and sufficient for the game to terminate at z: π j ∈ Π j (z) for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {i}, π i ∈ Π i (σ), and π ∈ Π i (z). Correspondingly, the probability that the game ends at z ∈ Zσ is
(13)
• The path from the root to z passes through information setÎ but does not include playing actionâ atÎ. The game can end in this state both if the mediator recommends all the players to play in order to reach z, and thus the trigger agent never gets triggered, or if the mediator recommends to playâ atÎ but then the trigger agent deviates and plays according to the reduced-normal-form planπ ∈ Π i (z) sampled from the distributionμ. Hence, the probability that the game ends at z ∈ ZÎ \Zσ is the sum of two terms, as follows:
• Otherwise, the trigger agent never gets triggered, and instead followings all recommended moves until the end of the game. The probability that the game ends at z ∈ Z \ ZÎ is therefore
With this information, the expected utility of the (σ,μ)-trigger agent is computed aŝ
By following the same steps that have already been taken for NFCCE and EFCCE, one can now write the constraint defining an EFCE in the following, compact way:
which needs to hold for all players i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and sequencesσ ∈ Σ i . Inequality (15) is in the form ξ A i,σ y i,σ − b i,σ ξ ≤ 0 where A i,σ and b i,σ are suitable matrices/vectors that only depend on the trigger sequenceσ of Player i. From this formulation, one can obtain a linear program for computing an EFCE optimizing over any linear function of ξ, following the steps that we have outlined in the secion about linear programming for NFCCE. We only give here the final LP.
(16) :
B. Proofs
Proposition 5. Let Γ be a perfect-recall extensive-form game. Then we have the following inclusion of equilibria
Proof. We break the proof into two parts, which can be read independently.
EFCE ⊆ EFCCE Let ξ ∈ Ξ be an EFCE. We need to show that, given any player i, decision pointÎ ∈ I i and extensive-form strategy yÎ ∈ Q i such that yÎ (σ i (I)) = 1, Inequality (11) is satisfied. The crucial ingredient in the proof is the fact that for any I ∈ I i and z ∈ Z,
by definition of Ξ (2). Hence,
Since ξ is an EFCE and yÎ (σ i (Î)) = 1 by hypothesis, the quantity in square brackets in ( ) is upper bounded as in Inequality (15). Hence we can write
where the second equality follows from the fact that the collection of sets {Zσ}σ ∈Î forms a partition of ZÎ . This shows that Inequality (11) holds for any applicable choice of player i, decision pointÎ and deviation strategy yÎ , and therefore ξ is an EFCCE.
EFCCE ⊆ NFCCE Let ξ ∈ Ξ be an EFCCE. We need to show that, for any player i and extensive-form deviation strategy y i ∈ Q i , Inequality (4) is satisfied. To this end, let I * i be the set of initial decision points for the given player, defined as all information sets that has an empty parent sequence; in symbols, I * i := {I ∈ I i : σ i (I) = ∅ i }. The collection of sets {Z I } I∈I * i is a partition of the set of all leaves Z. Hence, using the fact that σ i (I) = ∅ i for all I ∈ I * I :
where the inequality follows from Inequality (11), which is applicable since ξ is an EFCCE by hypothesis, and y(σ i (I)) = y(∅ i ) = 1 by definition of Q i . This shows that Inequality (4) holds for any player i, and therefore ξ is an NFCCE.
Proposition 6. The sets U EFCE , U EFCCE , U NFCCE are convex polytopes. Furthermore,
Proof. First, observe that the set of NFCCE is a convex polytope, since it is the intersection of Ξ with Inequality 4 for all relevant instantiations (i.e., all players i in the case of NFCCE). (Equivalent statements hold for EFCCE and EFCE). Second, the function that maps a ξ ∈ Ξ to the tuple of expected payoffs (one for each player) under the assumptions that players do not deviate from the recommendation strategy encoded by ξ, namely
, is linear. Since the image of a convex polytope with respect to a linear functions is a convex polytope, the first part of the statement follows. The second part of the statement follows trivially from Proposition 5.
Proposition 3. SW EFCCE (κ) is NP-Hard in two-player games with chance moves.
Proof. Given a SAT instance (C, V ) in disjunctive normal form, where C is the set of clauses and V the set of variables, we can build an extensive-form game as follows (see Figure 3 for an example of such a game tree):
• at the start of the game, chance selects one action in the set {a φ |φ ∈ C} uniformly at random, that is it picks non-deterministically a clause in the SAT formula;
• each action a φ leads to a node h φ ∈ I φ of Player 1, where he can choose an action to play in the set {a φ,l |l ∈ φ}, that is it selects a literal in the clause φ;
• all actions a φ,l with l = v or l =v for some v ∈ V lead to node h φ,l ∈ I v of Player 2, where he can choose an action to play in the set {a v , av}, that is it selects a truth assignment for variable v;
• actions {a v , av} lead to terminal nodes, where the players receive utility (0, 0) if l = v and action av was played or if l =v and action a v was played, and they receive utility (1, 1) otherwise.
If the SAT formula is satisfiable, this game admits a pure Nash Equilibrium in which Player 2 plays the truth assignment that satisfies it and Player 1 selects a satisfiable literal for each clause; in this case, the expected utility for both player is 1 and thus the social welfare is 2. If the SAT formula is not satisfiable, then for any truth assignment there exist at least one clause for which no literal can evaluate to true, which means that any strategy profile will lead to at least one (0, 0) outcome and thus the social welfare will be strictly smaller than 2. Since any Nash Equilibrium is trivially also an EFCCE, and since 2 is the optimal outcome of the game, the pure Nash Equilibrium described above is also an EFCCE. Hence, any polynomial time algorithm for deciding whether it exists an EFCCE with social-welfare greater than 2 could be employed to decide whether a SAT formula is satisfiable or not. Proposition 4. SW EFCCE (κ) is NP-Hard in three-player games, with or without chance moves.
Proof. The proof is similar to the one for two players with chance, with the only difference that we now have to employ the introduction of a third player to simulate the random chance move. This requires only a small modification in the extensive-form game. In fact, it is sufficient to replace the player at the root node with Player 3, that can choose one action in the set {a φ |φ ∈ C}. The game then proceeds unchanged, with Player 3 receiving as payoff 1 − u 1 where u 1 is the payoff received in the same terminal node by Player 1.
If the SAT formula is satisfiable, then the game admits at least one Nash Equilibrium with a social welfare of 2.
Regardless of the strategy employed by Player 3, Player 1 can in fact always select one literal for each clause such that they all evaluate to true under the truth assignment played by Player 2. If the SAT formula is not satisfyable, then every Nash Equilibrium has a social welfare strictly smaller than 2, as Player 3 is incentivized to play in a way as to reach as many non-satisfiable clauses, after which no strategy of Player 1 and 2 can get anything better than a social welfare of 1. Thus, the same argument of the two player with chance proof still holds, hence the SAT problem can be reduced to the SW EFCCE (κ) one. Table 3 . Experimental results on several instances of the Goofspiel game. 
C. Additional Figures
D. Game Instances Used in Our Experiments
For a detailed explanation of the games of Sheriff and Battleship, see the work by Farina et al. (2019) that introduced them. In this section, we will only briefly review the most important parameters that characterize them.
Where applicable, we will use the same symbols as Farina et al. (2019) in the descriptions of the games below.
D.1. Sheriff
The Sheriff instances that we use in our experiments are parametric over the maximum number n max of illegal items that the Smuggler can load in his or her cargo, the maximum bribe b max that can be offered to the Sheriff, and the number of bargaining rounds r between the two players. Increasing any of this parameters affects the size of the resulting game instance. The other parameters of the game are set to the fixed values v = 5, p = 1, s = 1 in all of our game instances.
D.2. Battleship
Our instances of the Battleship game are parametric on the grid size (w, h), and the maximum number of rounds r that players have. The loss multiplier γ was set to the fixed value 2 in all of our instances. Furthermore, each player has exactly one ship of length 1 and value 1.
D.3. Goofspiel
The variant of Goofspiel (Ross, 1971 ) that we use in our experiments is a two-player card game, employing three identical decks of r cards each. At the beginning of the game, each player receives one of the decks to use it as its own hand, while the last deck is put face down between the players, with cards in increasing order of rank from top to bottom. Cards from this deck will be the prizes of the game. In each round, the players privately select a card from their hand as a bet to win the topmost card in the prize deck. The selected cards are simultaneously revealed, and the highest one wins the prize card. In case of a tie, the prize card is discarded. Each prize card's value is equal to its face value, and at the end of the game the players' score are computed as the sum of the values of the prize cards they have won.
E. Additional Experimental Results
See Table 3 for experimental results on Goofspiel.
